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THE TIME OF RE-LIVING. FOR AN EVENTFUL 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 
 
Psychoanalysis and the Event of Fragmentation  
In the psychoanalytic frame we can discern qualities of time that 
are invisible elsewhere. As Gilles Deleuze (1988) wrote, time is ‘a 
polyphony of polyphonies.’ In what follows, I disentangle one thread 
of this polyphony, which I call the time of re-living. To trace this 
complicated time, I am in dialogue with Sándor Ferenczi, who left us 
many theoretical and clinical clues to assemble an eventful 
psychoanalysis. But what can give the singularity of this ‘event’? 
Surely, we cannot ignore the many decades of conversations that make 
us suspicious of the event as the carrier of a modern ethos, where, in a 
moment of rupture, something deemed new constantly displaces or 
replaces something that got old. A close reading of Ferenczi’s work 
brings into focus a unique psychoanalytic event, which comes with its 
own metapsychology: the event of psychic fragmentation. In other 
words, Ferenczi’s great interest in psychic splitting amounts to a 
metapsychology of fragmented psyches, but also to filling a 
phenomenological gap in psychoanalysis, by giving precise 
descriptions of what is being split in the psyche and of the life of the 
fragments that result from the splitting (Soreanu 2018). 
In what follows, I disentangle various facets of the event of 
fragmentation and I argue that it consists in sets of violent temporal 
relations, where it is not a case of various moments in time crossing 
each other and thus creating meaning and memory, but a case of a clash 
between times. To start with, we can imagine it as a time of an other 
intruding in the time of subject, or shocking the subject out of their own 
time, or overwriting the time of the subject with a foreign and 
overwhelming time. But we can also imagine it as a violent internal 
plurality of the times of the subject, where different psychic fragments 
‘live’ inside a different time, in an overall effect of a-synchrony, and 
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where the times of some fragments seem to attack, displace, or negate 
the times of other fragments. 
Ferenczi’s ideas on time are a ‘graft’ on the Freudian 
Nachträglichkeit: they do not deny its operation, but make an addition 
that takes us in a different direction, both in terms of our 
metapsychological constructions and in terms of our clinical position in 
the consulting room. 
In a similar manner, there is a Ferenczian ‘graft’ to the Freudian 
ideas on repetition. Let us take a closer look at the kind of ‘graft’ we 
are observing. The 1920 Freudian text Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
made an important contribution in accounting for a ‘daemonic’ aspect 
of repetition, but it also inhibited us from imagining further types of 
repetition (Soreanu 2017).  
In 1920, Freud discovered a new form of repetition, which is not 
in service of the pleasure principle. When he solidified this important 
discovery, because of its strong anchoring in the primacy of the death 
drive, he closed the path to exploring other kinds of repetition. Our 
imaginary on repetition became partly ‘frozen’ after the uncovering of 
its ‘daemonic’ aspect. In a succinct formulation, in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, Freud theorizes two types of repetition. The first one is in 
service of the pleasure principle and it proceeds by linking. It happens 
in the transference, in the psychoanalytic setting, and it leads to 
recollection. The second type of repetition is in service of the death 
drive, and it is an attempt to restore a previous state of things, an attempt 
to return to the inanimate by way of a total extinction of tension in 
psychic life. This second kind of ‘daemonic’ repetition represents the 
core discovery of the text Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
With Ferenczi, we can imagine a kind of repetition that does not 
serve directly the pleasure principle, nor does it bear its first and most 
important connection to the death drive. It is primarily a reparative 
repetition aiming at eliminating residues of unworked-through traumas 
and at restoring some elements of a pre-traumatic state of the ego (or of 
the proto-ego). This repetition takes the form of an eventful re-living of 
the trauma. In what follows, I reflect on what constitutes the 
‘eventfulness’ of this sort of re-living, which occurs primarily in 
traumatic dreams and in the consulting room.  
Ferenczi gave a whole different meaning to the series 
repetition/remembering/reliving. Freud contrasted remembering with 
repeating and distinguished sharply between insight (memory or 
recollection) and experience (repetition or regression). Ferenczi saw 
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repetition, and particularly regression or experiential reliving, as one of 
the tracks of remembering. Importantly, reliving is the way of gaining 
access to the child in the adult, or what Ferenczi (1931a) speaks of in 
terms of ‘child analysis in the analysis of adults’. 
In Ferenczi’s theory, memory operates both through the ego and 
through the id, constituting two different regimes or tracks of memory, 
defined in their difference by their object-relatedness (Stanton 1990: 
84). In the regime of id memories, we find ‘bodily sensations’, referring 
to primal life and death trends. When these are elaborated 
retrospectively by the ego, they are lived as emotions. In the regime of 
ego memories, we encounter ‘projected sensations’, referring to the 
environment and to external occurrences. These tend to produce effects 
of objectivity, and they are experienced as verifiable consciously. The 
crux of the matter is how these regimes of memory interact, and whether 
the emotionality of the bodily sensations and the objectivity effects of 
the projected sensations come to be connected. We can argue that 
Ferenczian re-living aims at a composition between id memories and 
ego memories. 
Ferenczian repetition has its own track because it involves the 
memory register that was constituted around bodily sensations. It is thus 
very far from mere remembering (which, in Freudian terms, would be 
the ‘colder’ activity of the conscious part of the ego; or the passing of 
marks from the unconscious part of the ego to the conscious part of the 
ego). Ferenczian repetition is also oriented toward the clearing up of 
traumatic residues – this is why we think of it as reparative repetition. 
It occurs in dreams and in certain forms of regression or in enactments 
in the psychoanalytic frame. Finally, it stands in a curious relation to 
the idea of restoring a previous state of things, which in Freud is 
interpreted as restoring the inanimate state, where tension is absent. 
What is being restored in a Ferenczian paradigm, in my view, is a state 
akin to the pre-traumatic state of the ego or of the proto-ego. This form 
of reparative repetition, therefore, passes through the self-preservative 
instincts or the ego instincts. In other words, we need the ego instincts 
to come to understand how this form of repetition works. It can only 
secondarily be said to operate in the service of the pleasure principle. 
Without the implication of the register of memory of the id, the re-
attunement between emotionality and rationality, which became split 
from each other at the time of the trauma, cannot be achieved. 
This brings us to Ferenczi, to his conception of the symbol, and 
to his ideas on analogical thinking. Association – linking across levels 
of sensoriality and signification – brings an alteration of material 
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structures, and a re-organisation of the very fleshiness of the body. 
‘[T]he symbol – a thing of flesh and blood’, Ferenczi (1921:352) writes. 
The implications of this conception of the symbol are profound. 
I would like to ponder here on the idea of the non-arbitrary that emerges 
from Ferenczi’s work and from his philosophical ideas on mimetism 
and analogy. Even language imitates the body and body parts in a 
complicated manner. This means that associations have a necessary 
aspect to them, and thus they also need to be very precise. Marion 
Oliner (2013) has recently drawn our attention to the fact that although 
there is a growing body of work in psychoanalytic theory on the 
irrepresentable, the non-represented or non-represented mental states 
(Green 1996; Roussillon 2011), we are still confronted with an 
unsettling clinical-empirical puzzle in the fact that there is often a very 
striking accuracy in the enactments and actualizations of the traumatic 
events, even when the memory of them remains inaccessible to 
consciousness. This is to say that the psycho-soma is able to re-stage 
the traumatic events with a great level of precision. This precision and 
minuteness of detail leads us to believe that the crux of the matter is not 
that these marks were not presented in any way to the psyche, or that 
they belong to the realm of the irrepresentable. 
Oliner (2013) uses ‘non-represented’ in inverted commas, to 
draw our attention to the overuse of his term to cover situations where 
actually what is missing are the associations between different modes 
of representation (or, we would say, between different modes of 
presentation in the psyche). The crux of the matter, rather, is another 
Ferenczian theme: that of the splitting of the psyche during a moment 
of excessive stimulation, when the psyche cannot convert the amount 
of free energy invading it into linked energy. In short, we can say that 
the reason why association is at times very difficult and painful across 
different sensorial modalities is because we are dealing with modes of 
presentation belonging to different split-off parts of the psyche, rather 
than because the traumatic event has not presented itself to the psyche 
in any way that produces a mark. 
The Ferenczian reading of Nachträglichkeit would entail, firstly, 
a psychoanalytically plausible version of a type of ‘time-travel’, where, 
via what Ferenczi calls the memory of the id, or sensorial memory, we 
become able to ‘touch’ another time. (Here, I use ‘touch’ as a metaphor 
for multi-sensorial access, not just in the strictly tactile sense – it may 
be acoustic, olfactive, kinetic, etc). 
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Secondly, as we will see in what follows, a Ferenczian 
Nachträglichkeit also involves in the structure of the traumatic scene a 
third presence, which ‘locks-in’ the trauma, via denial (or 
misrecognition of the nature or of the magnitude of the child’s 
experience, whose world was broken by the intrusion of the language 
of passion of the adult). When, in a clinical setting, different sensorial 
modalities become linked with one another, and the memory of the id 
becomes connected in stronger ways to the memory of the ego, what 
we achieve are effects of authenticity, which are at the core of the 
process of healing. Originally, the trauma brought about the splitting of 
sensorial modalities and of parts of the more or less developed ego, 
producing effects of inauthenticity. It is crucial to mark that the memory 
of the id is capable of some form of inscription. This means that both in 
the ‘locking-in’ of the trauma, and in its subsequent unpacking and 
working-through, the memory of the id has a leading role. The reliving 
of a different moment in time and the recuperation of the split-off parts 
of the ego unfold in the spirit of the marks inscribed via the memory of 
the id. In other words, healing occurs guided by and in the spirit of the 
memory of the id.  
Thirdly, a Ferenczian Nachträglichkeit acknowledges the 
violence of the temporal threads that cross one another in the psyche. 
For Ferenczi, trauma occurs in the form of a ‘confusion of tongues’ 
(Ferenczi 1933) between children and adults. Children speak the 
‘language of tenderness’ which is an experimental, playful and 
expansive register, through which more and more of the outside world 
is taken inside. Adults speak the ‘language of passion’, the register of 
adult sexuality, which has known repression and guilt. The meeting of 
the two languages causes children shock, a sense of intrusion, and an 
unbearable intensity. The meeting of ‘languages’ is a meeting of times 
as well. It is the time of guilt intruding in the time of play. This violent 
crossing of times is rehearsed and restaged in the psyche.   
The confusion of tongues is thus an asymmetric encounter 
between two psychic registers. Furthermore, for Ferenczi, any 
traumatic event occurs in two moments and it includes three presences. 
A first moment is that when the language of passion intrudes into the 
language of tenderness (and this can take the form of an actual sexual 
assault or of a psychic transmission). The second moment is that of 
denial [Verleugnung] when a third adult called upon to recognize the 
intrusion fails to do so. It is only through the action of denial that an 
intrusive event becomes a trauma, bringing a near-death of the self, 
producing a gap in memory, and destroying the capacity of the subject 
to trust their own senses.  
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The event of fragmentation is not a unitary or abstracted one. 
Instead, it presents itself to us with various facets. We can say that 
fragmentation condenses different forms of eventfulness. In what 
follows, we discuss the event of survival; the event of being beside 
oneself; the event of alienation; autoplastic events, including the 
emergence of the Orpha fragment of the psyche; the event of re-living 
on the psychoanalytic couch (neo-catharsis). 
The Event of Survival 
While Ferenczi insists that the adaptive potential ‘response’ of 
very young children to sexual or other passionate attacks is much 
greater than one would imagine, it is worth stressing that what is at stake 
is not necessarily an act of sexual abuse. Indeed, what is at stake is a 
psychic transmission. In On Shock, Ferenczi clarifies this point: ‘Shock 
can be purely physical, purely moral, or both physical and moral. 
Physical shock is always moral also; moral shock may create a trauma 
without any physical accompaniment’ (Ferenczi 1932a: 254). As Jay 
Frankel (2015) has shown, the place of the aggressor here is occupied 
in most cases by a narcissistically compromised care-giver. The ‘attack’ 
therefore consists of parts of the care-giver’s mind intruding into the 
child; appropriating aspects of the child’s mind and using it for the care-
giver’s own purposes (Frankel 2015); or inverting the parent-child 
relationship, so that it responds primarily to the care-giver’s needs and 
not to those of the child (Frankel 2015). 
The first response to the attack is a state of traumatic paralysis, 
which is incompatible with any sort of psychic spontaneity or activity 
of psychic defense. The paralysis is not a fleeting state or a moment of 
adaptation. Instead, it is capable of changing the structural organisation 
of the psyche, and it generates a ‘frozen fragment’ of the psyche, which 
is silent, deadened and fully de-libidinised. This frozen fragment moves 
outside time and any sense of unfolding. As Ferenczi describes: 
First, there is the entire paralysis of all spontaneity, including all 
thinking activity and, on the physical side, this may even be 
accompanied by a condition resembling shock or coma. Then there 
comes the formation of a new—displaced—situation of 
equilibrium. If we succeed in making contact with the patient even 
in these phases, we shall find that, when a child feels himself 
abandoned, he loses, as it were, all desire for life or, as we should 
have to say with Freud, he turns his aggressive impulses against 
himself. Sometimes this process goes so far that the patient begins 
to have the sensations of sinking and dying. He will turn deadly 
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pale, or fall into a condition like fainting, or there may be a general 
increase in muscular tension, which may be carried to the point of 
opisthotonus.  
Ferenczi 1931a:137–8 
The absolute paralysis of motility in the moment of the attack 
includes the inhibition of perception and, with it, the inhibition of 
thinking (Ferenczi 1931b: 240). The traumatic impressions that occur 
at the time of the attack cannot be recorded via the system of memory 
of the ego, because this would involve the presence of thinking, even if 
we are talking about processes of repression. These impressions are thus 
taken up by the psyche without any sort of resistance. While Ferenczi 
hesitates between suggesting that ‘no memory traces of such 
impressions remain, even in the unconscious, and thus the causes of the 
trauma cannot be recalled from memory traces’ (ibid) and describing 
instead the elements of the new system of memory of the id, I have 
shown that the precision of the traumatic re-enactments leads us to 
believe that some marks, in the first instance incompatible with 
thoughts, are presented to the psyche. 
The fact that the traumatised subject survives, psychically and 
physically, the moments of traumatic paralysis, is a highly improbable 
event, in terms of the state of the drives. In other words, it is a time that 
is so radically dominated by the operation of the death drive and so 
prone to un-linking, that the ‘the event of survival’ requires an 
explanation.  
Alongside the ‘frozen fragment’ of the psyche that moves outside 
time, there are other psychic forces at play. Ferenczi speaks of a psychic 
dimension always latent in the soma, and, interestingly enough, in all 
material substance. This manifests as a series of ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic inclinations (or ‘motives’). Ferenczi discusses this primal 
substrate in the first pages of his Clinical Diary, pointing to a process 
when different organs or body parts produce effects of thinking, and are 
able to perform surprisingly minute calculations that have as a result the 
preservation of life. 
Inorganic and organic matter exist in a highly organized energy 
association, so solidly organized that it is not affected even by 
strong disruptive stimuli, that is, it no longer registers any impulse 
to change it. Substances are so self-assured in their strength and 
solidity that ordinary outside events pass them by without eliciting 
any intervention or interest. But just as very powerful external 
forces are capable of exploding even very firmly consolidated 
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substances, and can also cause atoms to explode, whereupon the 
need or desire for equilibrium naturally arises again, so it appears 
that in human beings, under certain conditions, it can happen that 
the (organic, perhaps also the inorganic) substance recovers its 
psychic quality, not utilized since primordial times. In other words 
the capacity to be impelled by motives [Bewegtwerden durch 
Motive], that is, the psyche, continues to exist potentially in 
substances as well. Though under normal conditions it remains 
inactive, under certain abnormal conditions it can be resurrected. 
Man is an organism equipped with specific organs for the 
performance of essential psychic functions (nervous, intellectual 
activities). In moments of great need, when the psychic system 
proves to be incapable of an adequate response, or when these 
specific organs or functions (nervous and psychic) have been 
violently destroyed, then the primordial psychic powers are 
aroused, and it will be these forces that will seek to overcome 
disruption. In such moments, when the psychic system fails, the 
organism begins to think. 
 Ferenczi 1932b: 5–6 
In the hour of the traumatic attack, the event of survival means 
maintaining a beating heart or getting air into the lungs, against all odds. 
All available psychic energy is concentrated on one task, an apparently 
simple one, but without which preserving life would be impossible. The 
heart, at this time, becomes a ‘thinking’ heart.  
The Event of Being Beside Oneself. Alienation as a Temporal 
Relation 
Unlike the Kleinian ‘projection’ of the unwanted aspects of the 
self, we encounter in Ferenczi’s work a curious libidinal act that can be 
read more as a temporary re-location or ex-corporation of the ego, 
rather than a mere projection. In his text On the Analytic Construction 
of Mental Mechanism, Ferenczi (1930a: 222) will call this ex-
corporation of the ego ‘getting beside oneself’. This psychic act requires 
tremendous psychic energy. Although this fragment is associated to a 
temporary state in the scene of the trauma, I believe it should not be 
treated fleetingly. It generates a kind of psychic ‘trail’ that the psyche 
can later repeat or reconstitute in situations of abuse or strain: 
Another process requiring topical representation is characterized 
in the phrase ‘to get beside oneself’. The ego leaves the body, 
partly or wholly, usually through the head, and observes from 
outside, usually from above, the subsequent fate of the body, 
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especially its suffering. (Images somewhat like this: bursting out 
through the head and observing the dead, impotently frustrated 
body, from the ceiling of the room; less frequently: carrying one’s 
own head under one’s arm with a connecting thread like the 
umbilical cord between the expelled ego components and the 
body.)  
Ferenczi 1930a: 222 
Ferenczi crafts a language to talk about a phenomenon that many 
clinicians working with traumatised patients have noted: the peculiar 
moment of exiting the body, of observing oneself from the ceiling, as if 
the self were an other. This ‘othering of the self’ produces an important 
dissociation, a sense of exteriority from their own experience that is 
available to the self in subsequent situations that mimic the scene of the 
trauma. The psychic fragment ‘observing from the ceiling’ marks what 
I call a ‘pre-Orpha function’: it develops after the moment of traumatic 
paralysis, which we described above, and which was experienced as a 
near-death, as a cessation of all thought and feeling; and before the 
coagulation of the Orpha-fragment of the psyche, which, as we will see 
in what follows, comes in the shape of a ‘guardian angel’ – a true, 
stable, and fully shaped dissociation, capable of watching over the 
abused child, abandoned by all external helpers and subjected to the 
overwhelming force of the aggressor. 
In an entry of the Clinical Diary, Ferenczi argues:  
If I am to believe what my patients repot about similar states, this 
‘being gone’ is not necessarily a state of ‘non-being’, but rather 
one of ‘not-being-here’. As for the ‘where’, one hears things like: 
they are far away in the universe; they are flying at a colossal speed 
among the stars; they feel so thin that they pass without hindrance 
through the densest substances; where they are, there is no time; 
past, present and future are simultaneous for them; in a word, they 
feel they have overcome time and space. Seen from this 
gigantically wide perspective, the significance of one’s own 
suffering vanishes, indeed there develops a gratifying insight into 
the necessity for the individual to endure suffering, when opposed 
and combatant natural forces meet in one’s own parson. 
 Ferenczi 1932b: 32 
What we can discern here is a state of traumatic omnipotence, 
based on particular kind of violent temporal relations. The particular 
kind of timelessness described here is one where a part of the subject 
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feels triumphant over time or feels like they have overcome time or 
‘killed’ time altogether.   
There is also a particular kind of alienation that derives from 
different parts of the psyche being in their own times. We are referring 
to a violent internal plurality of the times of the subject, where the 
different psychic fragments ‘living’ inside a different time create an 
overall effect of a-synchrony. The times of some fragments seem to 
attack, displace, or negate the times of other fragments. Here, the time 
resulting from ‘being beside oneself’ attacks the sense of unfolding of 
the more conscious and well-adapted parts of the ego.  
Let us look closer to this violent internal plurality of times. When 
subjected to an overwhelming psychic transmission or to an attack, the 
child can go through an instantaneous maturation, and develop the 
emotions of an adult. This premature coming of age is often 
accompanied by being able to perform roles more easily associated with 
motherhood or fatherhood, than with childhood. The playful, 
spontaneous, gradual appropriation of the world stops, while the 
traumatised child migrates to a place of ‘carer’ for the narcissistically 
compromised adults around him, for other children, or even for parts of 
the self. Another facet of this precocity refers to sexual roles. It is worth 
noting that it is a fragment of the psyche that goes through what 
Ferenczi (1933, p. 165) calls ‘traumatic progression’ or ‘precocious 
maturity’, and not the entire personality. There is a traumatic 
bifurcation that happens, which produces a markedly paternal/maternal 
fragment, and other fragments that are still ‘childful’, in their needing 
the presence of the register of tenderness, of gentle care and gradual 
learning, in order to mature. 
Traumatic progression extends to the sphere of the intellect: the 
traumatised child will be capable of surprisingly wise utterings, 
sometimes to the delight of the adults around him, who will gratify and 
encourage faculties that are in fact results of traumatic dissociation. As 
Ferenczi poetically puts it: ‘It is natural to compare this with the 
precocious maturity of the fruit that was injured by a bird or insect’ 
(Ferenczi 1933: 165). Ferenczi regards the intellect as born out of 
suffering. The splitting that leads to the birth of intellect is recorded in 
the unconscious in the form of dreams where a ‘wise baby’ enters the 
scene, speaking in the voice and with the contents of an adult 
conversation. In the dream the wise baby starts teaching wisdoms to the 
entire family. The ‘wise baby’ became an important psychoanalytic 
construction for Ferenczi, through which he was able to better discern 
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the effects of the particular arrangement of the trauma-scene on his 
patients. 
Autoplastic Events. The Event of Orpha  
There are two kinds of responses of the ego to the trauma, 
according to Ferenczi. The first, corresponding to a highly developed 
sense of reality, he terms ‘alloplastic adaptation’, which means that the 
ego is able to alter the environment in such way that self-destruction 
and self-reconstruction are not necessary, and in such way that the ego 
maintains its equilibrium (Ferenczi 1930b, p. 221). The second he 
names ‘autoplastic adaptation’ (ibid), which means that ego does not 
have, or loses its capacity, to mould the external world, and instead 
takes action on itself. 
Perhaps one of the most eventful cases of autoplastic adaptation 
is the creation of new organs or new capacities – or, as he calls them, 
‘neoformations’ (Ferenczi 1926). In his 1926 essay on The Problem of 
the Acceptance of Unpleasant Ideas, he discusses how certain kinds of 
self-destruction lead to an enlarged recognition of the surrounding 
world and lead closer to the formation of objective judgement (ibid). To 
illustrate this kind of phenomena, he turns to a helpful biological 
analogy with Loeb’s eggs: 
This is similar to the phenomena noted in the ingenious attempts 
of Jacques Loeb to stimulate unfertilized eggs to development by 
the action of chemicals, i.e. without fertilization: the chemicals 
disorganize the outer layers of the egg, but out of the detritus a 
protective bladder (sheath) is formed, which puts a stop to further 
injury. In the same way the Eros liberated by instinctual defusion 
converts destruction into growth, into a further development of the 
parts that have been protected.  
Ferenczi 1926: 377 
 Ferenczi’s biological analogies allow him to extend his trauma 
theory and to observe that new faculties emerge at the time of the 
trauma. This opens new paths in psychoanalytic theory in terms of how 
we think of repair, and on how the ‘new organs’ created in traumatic 
times can be part of this repair. In the 30 July 1932 entry of his Clinical 
Diary, Ferenczi concludes: ‘A neoformation of the self is impossible 
without the previous destruction, either partial or total, or dissolution of 
the former self. A new ego cannot be formed directly from the previous 
ego, but from fragments, more or less elementary products of its 
disintegration. (Splitting, atomization.)’ (Ferenczi 1932b: 181). 
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There is yet another ‘eventful’ result of the time of trauma: this 
refers to the sudden creation of new organs. It is a kind of ‘teleplastic’ 
transformation (Ferenczi 1932b: 117), producing ad hoc organs, which 
become responsible for some of the organism’s functions: 
[...] it seems that it is possible for life to continue with the aid of 
purely psychical powers. Expressed in psychiatric terms: the 
hallucination of breathing can maintain life, even where there is 
total somatic suffocation. The hallucination of muscles and 
muscular power, cardiac strength, evacuation of the bladder, 
vomiting, accompanying the complete paralysis of these organs, 
can delay the disintegration of the organism. The patients feel, 
however, that in a ‘teleplastic’ fashion up to now perhaps believed 
in only by spiritualists, real organs, receptacles, gripping tools, 
tools of aggression are produced as ad hoc organs, which take 
charge of a greater or lesser part of the organism’s functions, while 
the organism is lying lifeless in a deep coma. Discharge of these 
functions occurs then extrasomatically. 
Ferenczi 1932b: 117 
The connections that Ferenczi makes between destruction, 
creativity and the creation of new organs should not however seduce us 
into a celebration of fragments, a sort of enthusiasm for a post-traumatic 
subjectivity. Such triumphalism of fragments is not in the spirit of 
Ferenczi’s work. Ferenczi remains lucid on the dark implications of 
splitting, which pass through a particular kind of narcissism, where the 
deadened fragments of the ego are denied. The ego becomes a kind of 
mosaic of dead and still-alive parts, but the deadened and de-libidinised 
parts are ‘forgotten’. Some of the fragments ‘assume, as it were, the 
form and function of a whole person’ (Ferenczi 1930a: 222).  
Among the fragments of the psyche that result from the 
unbearable attack in the moment of the trauma, we find a curious 
fragment, which Ferenczi names ‘Orpha’ – the feminine of Orpheus. 
Orpha is perhaps Ferenczi’s most complicated and eventful fragment.  
Orpha is the form that the organising life instincts take at the time of 
the trauma, precisely when the enormity of suffering has resulted in a 
renunciation of any expectation of external help. As Ferenczi notes, 
‘[t]he absent external help […] is replaced by the creation of a more 
ancient substitute’ (Ferenczi 1932b, p. 105). Orpha is a sort of ‘guardian 
angel’, a healing agent, and a principle of salvation: by surprising 
minute calculations around what it would mean to continue living (as 
we saw above, often in a basic sense of continuing breathing or 
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maintaining a beating heart), Orpha acts in the direction of self-
preservation. Orpha also ‘produces wish-fulfilling hallucinations, 
consolation phantasies; it anaesthetises the consciousness and 
sensitivity against sensations as they become unbearable’ (ibid:8). 
What is remarkable here – and of great political importance – is that 
with Orpha any dichotomy between reason and passion collapses. 
Orpha is created by the intrusion of the language of passion in the realm 
of the language of tenderness. Orpha is wise, but it is a fragment, it is 
split-off from other faculties. Orpha is formed when death is very near, 
but it acts as an organising life instinct. 
As I see it, Orpha brings an account of the emergence of hyper-
faculties and of over-performance. A strange product of the traumatic 
shock, Orpha manifests itself, Ferenczi writes, as ‘an unperturbed 
intelligence which is not restricted by any chronological or spatial 
resistances in its relation to the environment’ (Ferenczi 1931c: 245–6). 
One could say that Orpha is a metapsychologically plausible account of 
a particular kind of clairvoyance. Orpha’s time is a triumphantly 
eternalised time. It is the time of gods, saviours and miracles. Later in 
life, it persists as a time of a particular sort of omnipotence, one that 
violently pulls the subject away from the reality principle, and invites 
dangerous forms of over-exertion.  
The Time of Re-living on the Couch. Neo-catharsis 
If the psyche presents itself as a kind of mosaic of parts, some of 
which are alive and some of which are deadened (de-libidinised), then 
what does it mean to say that some form of reconstruction is possible 
and what does such a reconstruction rest upon? In his Clinical Diary 
Ferenczi makes an intriguing note: ‘in a manner which to us appears 
mystical, the ego fragments remain linked to one another, however 
distorted and hidden this may be’ (Ferenczi 1932b: 176). To achieve a 
fresh start in thinking about psychic healing we are to think about this 
note as a metapsychological assumption, rather than a metaphorical 
statement. This is confirmed by the fact that the ‘link’ preserved 
between the split parts of the psyche also makes its apparition in dreams 
and dream-like images and states. Patients sometimes bring us dreams 
of a cut-off body part that is still attached by one thread to the body. In 
such dream imagery, what is represented is not only the severed 
organ/head, but also the thread that connects it to the body. 
If we take this proposition seriously, what emerges as a question 
is: where and how can this thread be found and in which way can it be 
used for psychic healing? In the consulting room, this question brings 
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us to the crucial importance of re-living for approaching the trauma. 
The clinician will know that as a result of a traumatic shock, one part 
of the personality can ‘die’ (or, in other words, the libido can fully 
withdraw from a part of the personality), while the part that survives the 
trauma can wake up from the shock with a ‘gap in memory’ (or, to be 
more precise, with a gap in conscious memory, or the system of 
memory of the ego). The ‘thread’ that we are discussing passes through 
the system of memory of the id, which has an entirely different 
inscription mechanism from the system of memory of the ego. This 
does not mean that nothing was ever presented or preserved in the 
unconscious, but that to be able to access it, a re-living by way of 
regression is needed. Ferenczi noted that often in the second part of the 
analysis, what the patient experiences is a ‘collapse of the intellectual 
superstructure’, accompanied by a ‘breaking through of the 
fundamental situation, which after all is always primitive and strongly 
affective in character’ (Ferenczi 1931a: 140). This kind of regression 
will make possible a ‘new beginning’ – a term that Michael Balint 
(1968) will later put at the centre of his propositions on ‘benign 
regression’ and ‘the basic fault’. What is repeated in this event of re-
living is the original conflict between the ego and the environment and 
the painful intrapsychic solutions found for this conflict, in search of a 
fresh solution. 
This is where the experience of the ‘trace’ becomes relevant. It 
is however not any kind of mystical trance, but precisely ‘neocatharsis’, 
an experience of re-living the inscriptions made in the memory of the 
id, while arriving at some effects of reality, veridicity and conscious 
memory, in the presence of the analyst: 
It was easy to utilize these symptoms as fresh aids to 
reconstruction—as physical memory symbols, so to speak. But 
there was this difference—this time, the reconstructed past had 
much more of a feeling of reality and concreteness about it than 
heretofore, approximated much more closely to an actual 
recollection, whereas till then the patients had spoken only of 
possibilities or, at most, of varying degrees of probability and had 
yearned in vain for memories. In certain cases these hysterical 
attacks actually assumed the character of trances, in which 
fragments of the past were relived and the physician was the only 
bridge left between the patients and reality. I was able to question 
them and received important information about dissociated parts 
of the personality.  
Ferenczi 1929: 119 
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One difficult question is what the fundamental difference is 
between re-enactments driven by the compulsion to repeat and 
operating under the imperatives of the death drive, and this form of 
‘neocatharsis’. In other words, what precisely makes it possible for us 
to say that the re-living of the traumatic experience occurred under ‘new 
conditions’ (and potentially with a new resolution)? Here, the picture 
painted in Ferenczi’s work is a complicated one, but there are two 
recurring themes. One new condition is that of the constant elaboration 
by the analyst of their own ‘professional hypocrisy’ (1933), referring to 
the analytical posture that makes the patients repress their criticism 
directed to their analysts, in a similar way they repressed their criticism 
of the lack of love of the adults in their childhood. As he notes: 
We greet the patient with politeness when he enters our room, ask 
him to start with his associations and promise him faithfully that 
we will listen attentively to him, give our undivided interest to his 
well-being and to the work needed for it. In reality, however, it 
may happen that we can only with difficulty tolerate certain 
external or internal features of the patient, or perhaps we feel 
unpleasantly disturbed in some professional or personal affair by 
the analytic session. Here, too, I cannot see any other way out than 
to make the source of the disturbance in us fully conscious and to 
discuss it with the patient, admitting it perhaps not only as a 
possibility but as a fact.  
Ferenczi 1933: 158 
This sort of clinical sincerity makes it possible for the patient to 
experience the traumatic events of the past as thoughts or as objective 
memories, and not only as hallucinatory reproduction. 
The second way toward a new condition is aiming toward the 
horizontality of the analytic space. Because of the ubiquitous nature of 
phenomena of infantile obedience, there will certainly be little scope 
for any complete or enduring horizontality, but the analyst needs to 
invent new ways around and across submission. Ferenczi (1932b: 108) 
argues that: 
The most essential aspect of the altered repetition is the 
relinquishing of one own’s rigid authority and the hostility hidden 
in it. The relief that is obtained thereby is then not transient and 
the convictions derived in this way are also more deeply rooted.  
Ferenczi 1932b: 108 
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The analyst’s complicated work is to engage in some form of 
dialogue with psychic fragments that are already entangled in violent 
temporal relations. The crux of the matter then is intervening in these 
fraught temporal relations or finding ways to use the ‘odd’ times of 
some of the psychic fragments for the progress of the analysis.1 In 
several entries of the Clinical Diary, Ferenczi describes the experience 
of engaging the Orpha-fragment of the psyche. On the couch, Orpha 
appears as a fragment of the psyche that sometimes instructs, directs or 
guides the analyst with great precision as to what to do, how to speak, 
how to be silent, in order to allow the re-living of the traumatic 
sequence of events. In evoking the experience with one of his patients, 
Ferenczi writes: 
At her demand and insistence, I help her by asking simple 
questions that compel her to think. I must address her as if she 
were a patient in a mental hospital, using her childhood nicknames, 
and force her to admit to the reality of the facts, in spite of their 
painful nature. It is thought two halves have combined to form a 
whole soul. The emotions of the analyst combine with the ideas of 
the analysand, and the ideas of the analyst (representational 
images) with the emotions of the analysand; in this way the 
otherwise lifeless images become events, and the empty emotional 
tumult acquires an intellectual content.  
Ferenczi 1932b: 14  
Proposal of a woman patient, O.S.L during the trance, simulate 
thinking by asking very simple questions, to revive tactfully yet 
energetically the ‘ghost’ which has been given up, as it were, and 
slowly to persuade the dead or split-off fragment that it is not dead 
after all. Simultaneously the patient must encounter enough 
compassion and sympathy that it seems worth his while to come 
back to life.  
                                                          
1 ‘Each ‘adult’, who ‘takes care of himself is split (is no single psychic unit). 
Apparent contradiction: Sense of reality is possible only on the basis of a ‘fantasy’ 
(=unreality) in which a part of the person is sequestrated and is regarded ‘objectively’ 
(externalized, projected); this, however, is only possible with the help of a partial suppression 
of emotions (repression?)— Analyses which are carried through on the level of reality never 
reach the depth of the processes of splitting. Yet each succeeding development depends on 
the way it occurs (on its vehemence), on the time factor, and on the conditions, of the original 
splitting (primal repression). Only in earliest childhood, or before the original splitting, was 
anyone ‘one with himself. Deep analysis must go back under the level of reality into pre-
traumatic times and traumatic moments, but one cannot expect a proper resolution unless this 
time the resolution is different from the original one. Here intervention is necessary 
(regression and new beginning). Cf. the kindly understanding, the ‘permission to give vent’ 
and the encouraging calming reassurance (‘Suggestions’)’ (Ferenczi 1932d: 270-71). 
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Ferenczi 1932b: 39-40  
In his writing The Two Extremes: Credulity and Scepticism, 
Ferenczi speaks of ‘psychognosis’ or ‘gnosis’, which he sees as ‘the 
hope that it is possible, through an adequate profound relaxation, to gain 
access to a direct path to a past experience, which can be accepted 
without any other interpretation as being true’ (Ferenczi 1932c, p. 263). 
Here, the pre-traumatic time and the post-traumatic time touch, creating 
an opening for understanding a particular kind of utopia. What we 
arrive at through ‘psychognosis’ is not direct access to the experience 
‘of how things truly were’, but an effect of authenticity and an effect of 
veridicity. The post-traumatic state is, paradoxically, fuller in 
possibilities for enrichment and more radically relational than the pre-
traumatic state. Utopia is the multiplication and expansion of such 
psychic effects of authenticity and veridicity.  
Vignette 
Katarina arrived in my consulting room shortly after an 
attempted suicide. A few weeks before, she had taken all her medication 
at once, a combination of antidepressants and sleeping pills. Her 
husband had found her and she was taken to the hospital in time, 
avoiding any permanent damage to her physical health. In the first 
session she told me a lot about her dissatisfaction with her relationship, 
her feeling trapped in a couple with an older man with whom she fought 
often. She was able to talk directly about her suicide attempt, and she 
asked me for help. Her speech did not lack emotion and I found her 
expressive, but I also felt a heaviness and darkness at the core of what 
she was recounting. At times, it was as if a black metallic sphere was 
slowly coming toward me. The second session brought a surprise: 
Katarina told me the same sequence of episodes she had evoked in the 
previous session, using the same words and the same voice inflections. 
It was an uncanny repetition, and as the minutes of the session passed, 
I felt the metallic sphere even heavier. In the second half of the session 
I intervened and told her that I knew the story she was telling me 
already. I added that the story was familiar to me because she had told 
it to me in the previous session, but that I did not mind hearing it twice, 
or however many times she needed to tell it. She revealed that she had 
no recollection of having told me the same things in the previous 
session. She was occupied by chains of stories, which she was telling 
herself and, at times, other people, but without shifting the words or the 
colour of her voice. For the first part of her analysis, I often felt like a 
recording device storing encrypted sequences, which were hiding 
something dangerous.  
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After a few months, Katarina moved to the ‘dangerous place’ in 
my presence and she told me her secret. When she was around four 
years of age, she was playing in the house of her mother and stepfather. 
They had a pub on the ground floor, and one of the rooms was covered 
by a glass ceiling. Katarina thought she saw a doll on the glass ceiling, 
to which she could get through a side entrance, and she went to get it. 
While crossing the ceiling, it collapsed with her. She fell with it on one 
of the tables, where the customers were having their beer. The glass 
shattered and spread everywhere. While she was screaming on the table, 
her mother came and spanked her and scolded her for having broken 
the ceiling, while the stepfather stood and watched, doing nothing. 
Katarina had never forgotten what had happened, she had conscious 
knowledge of it, but a part of her psyche was in a pulverised state, just 
like the glass ceiling breaking into thousands of pieces. She was 
constantly falling and re-falling: her vocabulary around falls, drops, 
trips, tumbles and plummets was incredibly diverse. When she felt like 
she didn’t want to go on with life, she experienced a blank and memory-
less state where she would not take the pills, but ‘fall’ into her box of 
pills. When she was experiencing uncontrolled emotions, she would tell 
me she was afraid of ‘re-falling’ in one of the bad states. As a child, she 
was often left alone for long periods, to take care of herself, and also of 
a brother a few years younger than herself, who had a neurological 
diagnosis. She was also ruthlessly beaten, by both her mother and her 
stepfather. Given this extreme abandonment, I was often confronted 
with the sense of how improbable the event of her survival was: indeed, 
she had had to invent new organs to preserve her life in such 
circumstances. Self-caring was imperative, as she could not count on 
care by an other. But free-falling, total loss of control over the event of 
self-preservation was an equally active psychic possibility.  
One of the important directions of our ‘Orphic dialogues’ was 
that of re-experiencing the fall and slowing it down. I worked with a 
vocabulary that ‘transposed’ what she brought in the session to another 
speed, always decelerating her movement: it was not free-falling and 
plunging, but floating, hovering, drifting slowly. This was also a form 
of addressing the traumatic progression that falling through the roof, as 
well as other episodes of abuse, had brought. Indeed, Katarina was 
living across a-synchronic times, to the point that these were tearing her 
apart, pulverising her sense of self and pulling her into different 
directions. A part of her was repeating in her mind a complaint and an 
accusation for mistreatment, like a lullaby or a soothing internal sound, 
without any sense about the thousands of times that she had repeated 
the exact same complaint to herself. Her repetitions were an Orphic, 
self-caring sound. Another part of her was highly adapted: she 
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completed her studies and obtained a position of considerable 
responsibility. Another part of her, perhaps the most dangerous one, 
was boundless and pulverised, like a cloud of particles without contour, 
existing outside time lived in its unfolding, experiencing herself as an 
effect of an inhuman, cruel and unstoppable acceleration. When this 
part of her took over, she could ‘fall’ into the box of pills, without 
having any recollection of herself engaging in a set of actions, 
happening in a sequence: taking out the pills from the bag, taking off 
the lid, counting the pills, swallowing the pills. 
Several months after evoking the fall, Katarina told me about a 
very conflictual situation with her husband, when she felt she had lost 
control. She suddenly remembered something else she wanted to show 
me, and stood up from the couch, moving toward a chair in the 
consulting room where she had left her bag. While standing up, she 
paused and revealed that during the argument with her husband, she had 
picked up a vase and thrown it into a glass cabinet full of crystal glasses. 
The sliding doors of the glass cabinet were completely shattered. When 
telling me all this, she was making efforts to summon some feelings of 
shame for her ‘losing control’. What I felt was that beneath a thin layer 
of self-reproach there was excitement and enjoyment. The way she told 
this story, as well, was ‘de-railing’ from her usual grammar: there were 
pauses and seemingly un-related sequences. She was free-associating 
rather than voicing an eternal complaint. She was also standing up and 
looking at me, while I was following her from my chair. I intervened: 
in the past, when she had fallen through the glass roof, there was 
nothing she could control; now, when she broke the glass cabinet, she 
was standing and acting. Indeed, there had been some inversion 
between the horizontal and the vertical. For a moment, Katarina could 
have a glimpse into her enjoyment in causing – a derangement in the 
terrain of the pleasure of submitting and being subdued, which was 
dominating the relationship with her objects, but also the relationship 
between different parts of her self. A particular crossing of times was 
needed for our accessing and starting the analytic work with this 
‘alternative enjoyment’, involving being active, doing, and causing. It 
was a combination of acting-out (breaking the glass cabinet) and acting-
in (standing up and having part of her session while standing). Her 
standing up was akin to the state of ‘trance’ described by Ferenczi. She 
could re-live part of her fall, but this time while standing, and while the 
analyst was acknowledging her psychic pulverisation and her suffering.  
The re-living in this case involved both the shattering of the glass 
cabinet (while in analysis) and the telling of this shattering (in the 
consulting room, while standing). This was the beginning of a long 
working-through of the scene of trauma. It took the form of the analytic 
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pair engaging the violent temporal relations that the subject was living 
under. It was an instance of the time of re-living.  
Conclusions 
The clinical reimagining of Nachträglichkeit as implying a 
violent clash of times can produce important theoretical and clinical 
insights in psychoanalysis. Ultimately, there is a violent internal 
plurality of the times of the subject. Different psychic fragments ‘live’ 
inside a different time, creating an overall effect of a-synchrony. In 
other words, the times of some fragments attack, displace, or negate the 
times of other fragments. What we have looked at in this paper is how 
these sets of violent temporal relations can be theorised and can be put 
at the centre of a metapsychology of fragmented psyches.  
Thinking with Ferenczi, the event of psychic fragmentation fills 
up with different kinds of meanings and becomes less enigmatic and 
also less unitary. We can say that fragmentation needs to be thought in 
the plural. We can also say that fragmentation condenses different 
forms of eventfulness. The analyst faces the complicated work of 
engaging the psychic fragments that are already entangled in violent 
temporal relations. The analyst holds up the frame where the eventful 
re-living of the trauma can take place.  
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